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Fan Fiction and Canadian Copyright Law:




Amateur, non-commercial writing based on contemporary copyrighted
works — “fan fiction” — is a practice that is worth defending despite its unclear
status vis a vis copyright law. In this article, I assess how Canadian fan authors
may defend their works using Canadian copyright law. I argue that the recent cop-
yright reforms are promising for fan and other second generation creators. The
new fair dealing categories of parody and satire are positive steps, though the
broad and technologically neutral non-commercial user-generated content provi-
sion may be the most promising reform of all. I begin with an exploration of the
benefits of fan fiction writing before going on to assess how fan fiction may have
fared under the Copyright Act prior to the reforms. Subsequently, I argue that the
new users’ rights embedded in the Copyright Act, including the new fair dealing
exemption for parody and satire and, especially, the non-commercial user-gener-
ated content (“UGC”) provision, may finally articulate a needed legal breathing
space for fan fiction. While the UGC exemption appears tailored to YouTube and
other audiovisual content, it may actually be the most important development yet
for fan writers in Canada.
INTRODUCTION
Fan fiction, a genre of amateur derivative writing, is often assumed to infringe
copyright law.1 At best, fan fiction’s position vis a vis copyright law in jurisdictions
such as the United States and Canada is unclear. This lack of clarity stems partly
from the fact that copyright owners often ignore amateur fan fiction writers, who
* Rebecca Katz completed her BCL/LLB at McGill University in Montreal. She has
recently submitted her LLM thesis, “Gendered Bullying and Cyberbullying: Assessing
Ontario’s New Legislation”, to the University of Ottawa. The author would like to
thank Elizabeth Judge for supervising the first draft of this article as a Directed
Research project within the University of Ottawa’s LLM program. The author would
also like to thank Elizabeth Judge, Suzanne Bouclin, Jane Bailey and the editors of the
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology for their helpful feedback and input.
1 See e.g. Patrick McKay, “Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accom-
modate Fan-Made Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century” (2011) 24 Regent
University L Rev 117 at 121 (SSRN); see also Rebecca Tushnet, “Copyright Law, Fan
Practices and the Rights of the Author” in Jon Grey et al, eds, Fandom: Identities and
Communities in a Mediated World (New York: NYU Press, 2007) 60 at 60, on some of
the contradictory views of fan fiction’s legality [Tushnet, “Copyright Law, Fan
Practices”].
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may not seem like serious “threats” to rights owners’ economic interests. Perhaps
more significantly, amateur fan authors are unlikely to have the resources to defend
their hobbies in a protracted legal battle should rights holders take a dimmer view
of their work and issue a “cease and desist” notice.2 These factors have led to a
striking dearth of case law on the subject,3 which is surprising, given the fact that
the Internet is home to millions of fan stories inspired by countless novels, movies,
television shows and other media.4
In this article, I argue that recent changes to Canada’s Copyright Act, includ-
ing new fair dealing categories and, especially, the user-generated content provi-
sion, may help to articulate a much-needed legal breathing space for fan writing. I
begin by advocating a permissive approach to fan fiction, a practice that has much
to recommend it. Second, I attempt to assess how fan fiction may have fared under
Canadian law prior to the recent copyright reforms, and conclude that a new ap-
proach to non-profit, amateur-created content was necessary. While the new fair
dealing category of parody and satire is a positive step, I suggest that this category
may nevertheless be inadequate to address all the needs of the Canadian fan fiction
community. In my third and final section, I look at the new user-generated content
exemption, dubbed the “mash-up” or “Youtube” exemption, in section 29.21 of the
reformed Copyright Act. I assess the provision’s applicability to fan fiction, and
argue that it may be another advantageous development for Canadian fan writers —
perhaps the most advantageous innovation yet.
I. THE CASE FOR FAN FICTION
A novelist retells Jane Eyre from the perspective of Mr. Rochester’s “mad
wife”, and uses this retelling to challenge Jane Eyre’s sexist, classist, and colonial-
ist implications.5 A Sherlock Holmes fan writes a short story positing a homoerotic
relationship between Holmes and Watson, and publishes this short story in an on-
line fan archive and then, subsequently, in a professional anthology of Holmes pas-
2 See, for example, Sonia K. Katyal, “Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender
in Fan Fiction” (2006) 14 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol’y & L 461 at 469-470.
3 See e.g. McKay, supra note 1 at 122.
4 As of April 5, 2013, the Literature section of the archive www.fanfiction.net hosted
more than 600 000 Harry Potter fan stories, more than 200 000 Twilight stories and
approximately 48 000 works based on the Lord of the Rings series; the site’s Television
section was home to more than 92 000 stories based on the popular show Glee, more
than 75 000 Supernatural fan works, and more than 46 000 stories set in the fictional
Doctor Who universe. These popular categories are merely a small sample of the doz-
ens of original novels, television shows, movies, video games, and other media that
have fanfiction.net pages devoted to them, and which have inspired fan fiction stories
on that site. Furthermore, fanfiction.net is only one site among many that host fan fic-
tion. Rebecca Tushnet, writing in 2007, found over 1.2 million results for a Google
search of the phrase “fan fiction”: see Tushnet, “Copyright Law, Fan Practices”, supra
note 1 at 63.
5 Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea (New York: W W Norton and Company, 1992).
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tiches.6 A high school senior writes a lengthy, detailed sex scene involving a male
and female character from a popular television series, while a classmate writes sim-
ilar amateur erotica featuring two male — and canonically heterosexual — charac-
ters from the same franchise. What do these works have in common?
All of these works are derivative in some way. All borrow characters, settings,
or situations created by earlier authors in order to tell stories or explore ideas that
may be absent (or merely implied) in the original, or “canon”, texts. Moreover, all
of these works are part of a longstanding tradition in which stories written by a first
generation creator are rewritten or reworked by subsequent generations.7 However,
not all of these works are subject to equally favourable legal regimes.8 While the
practice of rewriting texts predates modern statutory copyright law,9 copyright stat-
utes make it difficult for next generation creators to create derivative works based
on books, TV shows, movies, or other media that are currently under copyright
protection.10
This copyright protection means that “fan fiction”, or amateur derivative
works written by fans of a pre-existing (typically copyrighted) text, exists in a legal
grey area.11 Fan writers may be accused of violating copyright or trademark law;
additionally, in countries that protect the moral rights of authors as Canada does,
fan writers may be accused of infringing upon the original authors’ moral rights,
6 Naomi Novik, “Commonplaces” in The Improbable Adventures of Sherlock Holmes
(San Francisco: Night Shade Books, 2009). This short story was originally made avail-
able on the Yuletide web site, a holiday fan fiction exchange archive, online:
<http://yuletidetreasure.org/archive/75/commonplaces.html>.
7 Graham Reynolds, “The Impact of the Canadian Copyright Act on the Voices of
Marginalized Groups” (2010) 48 Alta L Rev 35 at 35-36 [Reynolds, “Impact”].
8 Works that are in the public domain, such as those by the Brönte sisters, Dickens,
Shakespeare, and other classic authors are no longer under copyright protection and
may thus be reworked (by amateur or professional writers) with relative impunity: see
e.g. Reynolds “Impact”, supra note 7 at 41.
9 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7. Any number of classic literary texts, from Greek
tragedies to Shakespearian drama, draw upon and adapt earlier stories; this tradition
has continued in more recent novels and movies that adapt classic literature to new
contexts and eras.
10 It is difficult to draw a bright line between fan fiction and other derivative writings.
Context is important: writers can readily rewrite texts, such as ancient myths or classic
literary works, that are no longer under copyright, and can publish these rewrites in
professional contexts for commercial gain. However, fans of more current works fre-
quently develop rewrites of contemporary, copyrighted texts and distribute these works
in non-commercial venues such as Internet fan sites. I use the term fan fiction to mean
amateur derivative works that draw on pre-existing, often copyrighted texts. Other de-
rivative works — such as those based on classic public domain texts or myths, legends,
and folklore which may never have been copyrighted in the first place — fall into the
broader category of rewrites or second generation works, of which the fan fiction genre
is a particular subset.
11 McKay, supra note 1 at 121-122, on the legal ambiguity that overhangs fan fiction as
well as other fan-made media.
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i.e., the right to attribution and, especially, the right to the integrity of their work.12
I note, however, that the scope of this article prevents me from addressing the chal-
lenges artists’ moral rights may pose to fan fiction writers, fascinating though these
issues may be. Likewise, while some fan fiction writers may try to publish their
rewrites or parodies commercially,13 or attempt to use their fan fiction for other
income-producing purposes, the scope of this article compels me to focus on ama-
teur fan writers exclusively. I therefore use the term fan fiction to mean derivative
fiction that is written as a hobby and published in forums such as Internet web sites
from which the writers do not derive a profit.
These fan fiction works may seem at first to infringe on copyright owners’
economic rights and, arguably, on artists’ moral rights — even if the fan writers
make no profit from their stories. However, there are compelling arguments one
could make in defense of fan fiction. First, one could argue that most fan fiction
works would constitute fair use or fair dealing with copyrighted materials: fan fic-
tion is typically written without intent to profit or to replace first generation texts,
but merely comments on, reinterprets, or celebrates popular works.14 It has been
12 See e.g. Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 48-49.
13 It’s not unheard-of for fan writers to attempt to publish fan fiction stories (or reworked
stories which began as fan fiction) as original works that are merely inspired by the
writer’s initial “fandom”. Famously, this was the case with the bestselling erotica series
Fifty Shades of Grey, which began its life as a work of adult fan fiction based on the
adolescent romance series Twilight: see e.g. Rachel Deahl, “E.L. James and the Case of
Fan Fiction” Publishers Weekly (13 January 2012), online: PWXYZ LLC,
<http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/page-to-
screen/article/50188-e-l-james-and-the-case-of-fan-fiction.html>. Further, Ama-
zon.com has recently pioneered a licensing scheme by which it will obtain permission
from the owners of several copyrighted franchises to distribute fan-written works
through its Kindle Worlds program. Under the new Amazon scheme, the original rights
holders and the second generation fan fiction writers will receive royalties: see Olga
Kharif, “Amazon Wants to Sell Your Fan Fiction Through Kindle Worlds” Bloomberg
Business Week (13 June 2013), online: Bloomberg L.P.
<http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-13/amazon-wants-to-sell-your-fan-
fiction-through-kindle-worlds>. However, while these scenarios raise novel legal ques-
tions, it is impossible for me to address all of them in this paper.
14 See Rebecca Tushnet, “Legal Fictions: Fan Fiction, Copyright and a New Common
Law” (1997) 17:3 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment L J 651 at 664–678 [Tushnet,
“Legal Fictions”]. Tushnet analyses how fan fiction may fare on the American fair use
factors. To assess whether a work is fair use under the United States Code, courts must
consider four factors. These are the purpose and character of the use, including whether
the use is commercial or non-commercial, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: see 17 USC §107. The
second American fair use factor looks at the commerciality of the use and finds that
non-commercial uses are more likely to be fair: see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1984). This second factor also looks at
whether the use is transformative, and treats transformative uses (which cannot serve as
substitutes for the original copyrighted works) as more likely to be fair: see Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music Ltd., 510 U.S. 569 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1994). Non-profit, transforma-
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argued that fan fiction typically has little adverse impact (if any) on the market for
the original work;15 in fact, fans who enjoy a franchise enough to write their own
unauthorized interpretations or sequels are often the most devoted followers and
consumers of the original franchises.16 Indeed, fan fiction communities, like other
online fan communities, may even benefit rights holders because they can enhance
or maintain audience interest in original franchises or texts.17 Fan fiction is also
transformative in at least some respects:18 at a minimum, it adds the interpretations
or insights of the fan writers and transposes existing characters into new situations
of the (fan) author’s design.19 These changes ensure that most fan fiction stories
cannot serve as direct substitutes for the canon texts they draw upon. In the words
of one commentator, “fan fiction is not an accepted substitute to canon in the same
way that a pirated DVD is an accepted substitute to a legal DVD.”20 These aspects
of fan fiction suggest that it could meet the threshold for fair use or fair dealing in
the United States and Canada, though as noted, neither jurisdiction currently has
any jurisprudence on the subject.21 I revisit these arguments in greater detail below.
As well, fan fiction may have compelling public benefits. Graham Reynolds
explores some of the ways in which transformative second generation works can
promote the values that underlie Canada’s constitutional right to freedom of expres-
sion; namely, the search for political, artistic, and scientific truth, the protection of
individual autonomy and self-development, and the promotion of public participa-
tion in the democratic process.22 Transformative works can comment on topics
ranging from political issues to artistic genres. These works also allow consumers-
turned-creators to empower themselves and to rewrite culturally significant texts in
ways that speak to their own values or experiences.23
tive fan stories which do not impact the market for the original copyrighted texts may
therefore qualify as fair use under the American fair use factors. The Canadian situa-
tion may be somewhat more complex; my own analysis of fan fiction’s status under
Canada’s fair dealing regime follows later in this article.
15 Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14.
16 Ibid. at 669–674; see also Ernest Chua, “Fan Fiction and Copyright: Mutually Exclu-
sive, Coexistable or Something Else? Considering Fan Fiction in Relation to the Eco-
nomic/Utilitarian Theory of Copyright” (2007) 14:2 Murdoch University E L J 215 at
223, citing one fan fiction author’s commitment to buying canon materials for “re-
search purposes”.
17 Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 670–674.
18 Ibid. at 665.
19 Ibid.
20 Chua, supra note 16.
21 See e.g. McKay, supra note 1 at 122, on the dearth of litigation addressing fan-made
content.
22 RJR-Macdonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), 1995 CarswellQue 119, 1995
CarswellQue 119F, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), cited in Graham Reynolds, “Towards
a Right to Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright-Protected Expression”
in Michael Geist, ed, From Radical Extremism to Balanced Copyright (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2010) 396 at 399 [Reynolds, “Towards a Right”].
23 Reynolds, “Towards a Right”, supra note 22 at 399–402.
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Likewise, fan fiction can add or explore new perspectives that are absent in
original works by, for example, retelling a white male dominated narrative from the
perspective of an underdeveloped female love interest or a minority “comic relief”
character.24 Similarly, the “slash” fan fiction genre explores possible homoerotic
subtext in existing works and pairs characters into gay or lesbian relationships.25 A
work of slash fan fiction exploring the struggles of a gay Hogwarts professor or
Jedi knight may offer interesting commentary on sexuality and homophobia in our
own schools and militaries. Conversely, a work positing a wizarding world or a
galaxy far, far away in which homophobia and heterosexism are absent could raise
equally challenging questions about gender and sexuality on Earth.26
Likewise, studies of fandom demographics suggest that most fan writers are
women.27 Fan literature thus gives women and girls the opportunity to “write back”
to an often male-dominated media industry,28 and to challenge deeply ingrained
narratives of masculinity and femininity.29 Fan fiction may allow writers to explore
the relationships of beloved characters in a way that resonates more powerfully
with women’s experiences, or to sexualize attractive male characters in a way that
appeals to female desires — even where original works authored, produced, and
edited by men are only interested in sexualizing female characters.30 Consequently,
fan fiction sometimes provides a means by which people whose voices are under-
represented in media may engage with cherished narratives in a way that is more
meaningful to them. Copyright owners demanding that fan writers or web sites
“cease and desist” their activities can have the troubling effect of silencing already
marginalized voices and reinforcing gendered control of media narratives.
Moreover, even fan fiction works that do not necessarily delve into the con-
cerns of “outsider” groups can nevertheless contribute in novel, useful, and trans-
formative ways to artistic and cultural discourse. Some scholars, such as Patrick
McKay, argue that the Internet has facilitated the return to a pre-twentieth century
mindset in which popular participation in (and creation of) culture has once again
become a reality.31 While twentieth century technologies made it difficult for per-
sons other than corporations to develop or distribute major creative works, the
twenty-first century’s return to widespread amateur creativity should be celebrated
and legally protected.32 “Blockbuster” franchises such as the Star Wars movies and
24 See e.g. Graham Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 38–44, on the utility of fan and
professional rewrites for marginalized communities.
25 Katyal, supra note 2 at 468-469.
26 See e.g. Katyal, supra note 2 at 492–494.
27 Katyal, supra note 2 at 465-466 and 468-469.
28 Ibid. at 465-466.
29 Ibid. at 485–487, 496-497.
30 See e.g. Meredith McCardle, “Fan Fiction, Fandom and Fanfare: What’s all the Fuss?”
(2003) 9 BU J Sci & Tech L 433 at 442–444.
31 McKay, supra note 1 at 122-123; see also Katyal, supra note 2, citing Jenkins, at 482-
483. Graham Reynolds makes a similar argument to the effect that digital technologies
have democratized citizen participation in culture: see Reynolds, “Towards a Right”,
supra note 22 at 396-397 and 402.
32 McKay, supra note 1 at 122-123.
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bestselling book series like Harry Potter, Twilight, or The Lord of the Rings can
take on a status in our generation that is similar to ancient myths and folk tales.
Copyright law must recognize that audiences sometimes wish to engage, critique,
or reinterpret these popular myths without fear of legal action.
Finally, fan fiction can nurture creativity among members of the public. On-
line fan fiction communities often serve as social forums in which writings are not
only posted, but can also be actively critiqued. Amateur writers writing completely
original works — i.e., novel stories without the existing and enthusiastic fan bases
of franchises such as Harry Potter or Star Wars — cannot benefit from the net-
works of peers, reviewers, mentors, and collaborators available in online fan com-
munities.33 Meanwhile, the young amateurs swapping Harry Potter fan stories on-
line today — even those whose early writings seem uninspired — may be
developing the skills that will help them write tomorrow’s bestsellers. Fan creativ-
ity, as McKay notes, can actually serve American copyright law’s goal of promot-
ing the useful arts, rather than detracting from them.34 The Canadian Copyright
Act’s balance between ensuring just compensation for creators and promoting the
public interest35 could be equally well-served by the presence of a thriving, crea-
tive, and non-commercial fan fiction discourse.
Fan fiction is, therefore, not merely a “harmless” activity (economically
speaking). Instead, it can actually serve several important functions. Fan fiction
stories allow for more in-depth exploration of marginalized perspectives — such as
queer themes or women’s voices — than mainstream media narratives typically
do.36 The genre also empowers members of the public to engage creatively and
meaningfully with contemporary myths.37 Finally, the community-oriented nature
of fan fiction websites can foster creativity and allow future authors to hone their
skills. Fan fiction writing is therefore, on the whole, a practice that is worth defend-
ing in the face of potential copyright challenges.
Naturally, the prospect of making legal space for fan fiction begs the question
of how, practically, we may achieve this goal. Prior to the copyright reforms pro-
posed in Bill C-11 and enacted in the Copyright Modernization Act,38 Canada’s fair
dealing structure seemed to force fan fiction into a legal grey area at best. In the
next sections, I explore how fan fiction may have fared under the previous copy-
right regime, and how it may fare today given some of the new exemptions intro-
duced in the latest batch of copyright amendments.
33 For a discussion of the community-oriented nature of fandom, see Tushnet, “Legal Fic-
tions”, supra note 14 at 656-657.
34 McKay, supra note 1 at 119.
35 Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. c. Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, 2002 CarswellQue
306, 2002 CarswellQue 307, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (S.C.C.) at para 30; see also Public
Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 36, 2012 CarswellNat 2380, 2012 Car-
swellNat 2381 (S.C.C.) at paras 8 (reviewing Theberge) and 11 (re-affirming the im-
portance of balancing users’ and creators’ rights, as stated in CCH).
36 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7.
37 See McKay, supra note 1 at 119–121; see also Katyal, supra note 2 at 482.
38 Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20.
80   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [12 C.J.L.T.]
II. FAN FICTION IN CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
(a) Do fan fiction stories necessarily infringe copyright?
Before setting out a defense of fan fiction, it is important to ask whether these
stories necessarily infringe Canadian copyright law in the first place. Canadian
copyright law protects the exclusive rights of owners to “produce or reproduce the
work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever”.39 This exclu-
sive right to reproduce a work or a substantial part thereof is a central plank of
copyright in Canada.40 The Copyright Act also protects other rights, such as the
right to exhibit works to the public, to produce or publish works in translation, or to
adapt works to different mediums.41 The Act, however, is silent as to which dis-
crete elements of works, such as characters or settings, can be protected
independently.42
These questions are pertinent to fan fiction because most fan fiction stories are
not mere reproductions of the source texts.43 However, almost by definition, fan
fiction uses characters and other elements of existing works, generally in situations
of the fan authors’ creation. Do these portrayals “reproduce” characters and other
substantial parts of the original works in a way that infringes copyright? Consider
the fan who writes about a retired Harry Potter battling a new evil wizard. Is Harry
the character subject to independent copyright protection? Similarly, if a Star Wars
fan writes an original story with new characters set in the fictional Star Wars gal-
axy, are elements such as “the Force” and planets or other settings from the movies
independently copyrighted? Some works of fan fiction use established fictional uni-
verses to explore novel ideas. In such cases, do fan authors “produce or reproduce
[. . .] any substantial part” of the original text?
There is relatively little case law on this subject in the United States and Can-
ada. Moreover, the few American and Canadian cases that have been litigated deal
with the protection of fictional characters. Although fan fiction stories often use
established characters, it is equally plausible for them to explore settings, refer to
technologies and, in general, utilize other canon elements besides pre-existing char-
acters. It is difficult to conjecture, from the jurisprudence on copyrighting charac-
ters, whether or how the same principles would apply to — for example — “the
Force” from the Star Wars series, the magic spells used in Harry Potter, or the
Hogwarts school. Nevertheless, it is helpful to look at the case law on whether
characters alone are substantial parts of a work for copyright purposes.
American jurisprudence has two distinct tests for assessing whether characters
are subject to copyright protection.44 The Learned Hand test, articulated by
39 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 s 3(1).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 See e.g. Daniel J Gervais & Elizabeth Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Can-
ada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 1128-1129.
43 Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 658.
44 Jacqueline Lai Chung, “Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal Space for
Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters” (2007) 49:3 William & Mary L Rev 903
at 906-907, 918–921.
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Learned Hand J. in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp,45 suggests that characters
may be copyrightable in some circumstances. To benefit from copyright protection,
however, characters must be sufficiently delineated and not simply ideas or com-
posites of ideas drawn from the public domain.46 While this standard may sound
like an elusive test for judges to apply, it aims to protect characters that are well-
drawn enough to constitute “expression” (and not mere “ideas”)47 and that are rec-
ognizable enough for other authors to avoid copying.48 American jurisprudence has
further adapted the Nichols test to ask, first, “whether the character is sufficiently
delineated or developed to constitute [. . .] expression” and, second, whether the
characters of the allegedly infringing work “significantly [resemble] the original
protected character to the extent where a finding of infringement is warranted.”49
This adaptation of the Nichols test may be particularly relevant to fan fiction, in
which authors can transform, develop, or merely mischaracterize characters from
original works such that they are no longer identical to the characters in the parent
text. The Nichols test may also be criticized for potentially offering creators of cer-
tain types of works — such as pictorial or animated works and realist or character-
driven writings — greater protection than authors writing in genres where charac-
ters need not or cannot be drawn as fully and may not qualify as readily for protec-
tion under this test.50
The US Ninth Circuit developed its own test for assessing whether characters
can be copyrighted in Warner Brothers v. Columbia Broadcasting.51 In this case,
the Court stated that fictional characters may receive independent copyright protec-
tion if they are significant enough to constitute “the story being told”,52 rather than
mere “vehicles”53 for the story. This standard has been criticized as setting a very
high bar for authors to protect their characters in copyright.54 After all, even in
works where characters’ development, actions, or journeys are highly significant,
most characters do not themselves “constitute” the stories in which they figure. As
well, this standard seems inapplicable to other elements of works, such as settings,
in all but extremely rare cases.
45 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir., 1930) [Nich-
ols]; see also Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 1129; see also Lai Chung, supra note
44, at 906-907, 918–921.
46 Nichols, supra note 45 at para 7; see also Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 1129.
47 Nichols, supra note 45.
48 Ibid. This, however, still begs the question of second generation authors who wish to
transform, parody, or critique existing characters.
49 See e.g. Giangrasso v. CBS Inc, 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y., 1982); Lone Ranger Inc.
v. Cox, 124 F. 650 (U.S. C.A. 4th Cir., 1942); Lewys v. O’Neil, 49 F. 2d 603 (1931);
Burtis v. Universal Pictures Company Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 823 (1953); see also Lai Chung,
supra note 44 at 919-920, summarizing these subsequent trends in the jurisprudence.
50 See e.g. Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 1129-1130.
51 Warner Brothers v. Columbia Broadcasting, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir., 1954) [Warner
Brothers]; for a discussion of this case, see also Lai Chung, supra note 44 at 921–924.
52 Warner Brothers, supra note 51.
53 Ibid.
54 Lai Chung, supra note 44 at 922.
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Canadian jurisprudence has likewise contemplated the independent copyright
protection of fictional characters.55 In Preston v. 20th Century Fox Canada Ltd,56
the Federal Court considered whether George Lucas and Lucasfilm infringed the
copyright of author Preston. Preston had developed a script, Space Pets, about a
war on a distant planet involving a species of primitive teddy bear-like aliens called
Ewoks.57 Preston alleged that the use of a similar alien species, also called Ewoks,
in Star Wars: Return of the Jedi infringed his copyright in his script Space Pets by
substantially reproducing it. Among other issues, the case considered whether the
Ewok characters were “a matter for copyright”.58 The Court applied the Nichols
test and stated that 
[. . .] the character must be sufficiently clearly delineated in the work sub-
ject to copyright that it becomes widely known and recognized. [. . .] In the
words of Learned Hand J. [. . .] “. . . the less developed the characters, the
less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for
marking them too indistinctly”.59
Ultimately, Preston’s Ewoks were not sufficiently delineated to warrant dis-
tinct copyright protection.60 However, the Court’s approval of Learned Hand’s test
suggests that characters meeting its criteria can be independently copyrighted in
Canada.61
The Preston test, however, does little to clarify the status of fan fiction in
Canadian copyright law. Are fan fiction works focusing on undeveloped back-
ground characters or “extras” less likely to infringe copyright, such that a story
about a minor Hogwarts student is less likely to run afoul of the law than one deal-
ing with Harry Potter himself? And what might a court make of a second genera-
tion work that uses well-delineated and distinctive settings or other elements from
the first generation text? These tests seem to entail a troubling level of arbitrariness
when applied to fan fiction, leading to situations where different fan works may
merit different treatment depending on the characters or scenarios they focus on.
The Quebec Court of Appeal’s judgment in Robinson c. Films Cinar inc.62
leads to similar uncertainty. In this case, TV writer Robinson successfully sued the
television corporation Cinar for infringing Robinson’s copyright in a children’s
program he had attempted to develop.63 The trial court found that Cinar’s series
Robinson Sucroe infringed the copyright in Robinson’s planned but ultimately un-
55 Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 1128–1130.
56 Preston v. 20th Century Fox Canada Ltd., 1990 CarswellNat 205, 38 F.T.R. 183 (Fed.
T.D.); affirmed 1993 CarswellNat 2391 (Fed. C.A.) [Preston].
57 Preston, supra note 56 at para. 7.
58 Ibid., at paras. 70–76.
59 Ibid. at para. 72.
60 Ibid. at paras. 70–76.
61 Gervais & Judge, supra note 44 at 1129.
62 Robinson c. Films Cinar inc., 2011 CarswellQue 7652, 2011 QCCA 1361, [2011] Q.J.
No. 9469 (C.A. Que.); reversed in part 2013 CarswellQue 12345, 2013 CarswellQue
12346 (S.C.C.) [France Animation].
63 Ibid. at paras. 4–9.
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developed series Robinson Curiosité.64 This case is interesting because the premise
of the show — a group of explorers living on an island à la Robinson Crusoe —
was not in issue.65 Rather, Robinson successfully alleged that the cast of characters
used in the later series substantially reproduced the characters in his own planned
show.66 The Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the trial court ruling that the similari-
ties between the casts of the two series constituted substantial reproduction.67 How-
ever, it should be noted that the characters in issue here are animated or pictorial:
cartoon characters. In addition to having similar personalities and cast dynamics,
the heroes of Robinson Sucroe bore striking visual resemblance to Robinson’s
sketches for Robinson Curiosité.68 The ease with which visual similarities can be
identified may make it easier for animated characters to receive copyright protec-
tion than literary or dramatic characters.69
Finally, other dicta in France Animation are also worth noting. The Court
states that to infringe copyright a work need not be a “slavish or exact imitation” of
the original,70 but may be a “colourable imitation [as long as it] reproduces a sub-
stantial part of the [original]”.71 Both similarities and differences must be taken
into account.72 However, the presence of differences between the two works at is-
sue may not offset the presence of even one or more substantial similarities — “the
use of a known important character from a comic strip may be enough [to consti-
tute infringement]”.73 Later, however, the Court states that differences can out-
weigh substantial similarities, and contemplates the “original and novel work [that
is] simply inspired by the first”.74 Exactly how these principles may apply to indi-
vidual fan fiction works is a matter for speculation.
American and Canadian case law thus allow for the independent copyright
protection of some, though not all, fictional characters. Furthermore, while it is not
clear in advance which characters will merit this protection, it seems that distinc-
tively drawn central characters and, perhaps, characters in animated media are more
likely to receive independent protection than indistinct peripheral characters, or
characters in non-visual media, such as literature.75 Copyright protection for fic-
64 Ibid. at paras. 14–19.
65 Ibid. at para. 87.
66 Ibid.
67 See ibid. at para. 101; see also paras. 54–70.
68 France Animation, supra note 62 at paras. 90–93.
69 Gervais & Judge, supra note 44 at 1129-1130.
70 France Animation, supra note 62 at para. 57.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. at para. 61.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid. at para. 66.
75 See e.g. Preston, supra note 56; see also France Animation, supra note 62 at paras.
90–93. I note in passing that authors can also protect characters, setting names, and
other aspects of their works in trademark, though the scope of this article prevents me
from discussing that intellectual property regime. For a detailed discussion of potential
concurrent copyright and trademark protection for fictional characters, see Andrea
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tional characters in turn makes it likely that some fan fiction stories, i.e., those
focusing on major, well-delineated pre-existing characters, could indeed run afoul
of Canadian copyright law. However, there is something troubling about the appar-
ent effects of the Learned Hand test approved in Preston on fan fiction. Why
should amateur authors who focus on minor or “insufficiently delineated” charac-
ters be granted an apparently privileged position? And how can fans predict how
any given character will fare on this test? Fan writers could allege that these direc-
tions lead to arbitrariness and uncertainty, which may impair the creation of worth-
while second generation texts.
There is a counterargument that it is appropriate for copyright to be more leni-
ent with second generation creators who focus on undeveloped characters or as-
pects of first generation works. Minor or background characters may fall on the
“idea” side of the idea/expression continuum, while developed ones presumably
fall within the “expression” category or side. Perhaps this setup is intended to bring
“more” expression to the public by making it somewhat easier for second genera-
tion creators to flesh out undeveloped aspects of source texts rather than rehash or
plagiarize stories that have already been told. However, fan fiction, parodies, or
other derivative works that deal with well-developed central characters may never-
theless bring novel perspectives to the original texts. In fact, it may sometimes be
necessary to rewrite or incorporate central characters and elements — rather than
undeveloped extras — in order to critique or reinterpret a work successfully. Fi-
nally, these arguments do little to clarify in advance how particular characters may
fare on these tests, or to offer fan writers any ex ante certainty about what activities
they may engage in without infringing copyright law.
It is therefore necessary to consider how fan fiction advocates can defend
those stories that do infringe copyright. I turn now to an analysis of what Canadian
fair dealing might have to say about fan fiction.
(b) Fan fiction and Canadian fair dealing before the Copyright
Modernization Act
In recent years, Canada’s fair dealing regime has undergone significant
shifts.76 The seminal 2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision CCH Canadian Ltd.
v. Law Society of Upper Canada held that Canada’s fair dealing defenses are user
rights and an integral part of the Copyright Act and should be interpreted broadly.77
This ruling profoundly altered the prevailing — and more limited — understanding
of fair dealing in Canada.78 The holding that fair dealing categories must be inter-
Slane, “Guarding a Cultural Icon: Concurrent Intellectual Property Regimes and the
Perpetual Protection of Anne of Green Gables in Canada” (2011) 56:4 McGill LJ 1011.
76 See Parveen Esmail, “CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada Case Com-
ment on a Landmark Copyright Case” (2005) 10 Appeal 13 at 13-14; see also Giusep-
pina D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Can-
ada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use” (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 309
at 323–327; see also CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC
13, 2004 CarswellNat 446, 2004 CarswellNat 447 (S.C.C.).
77 CCH, supra note 76 at paras. 48-49.
78 See Esmail, supra note 76 at 20-21.
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preted broadly, as well as the guidance the Supreme Court provided as to appropri-
ate (though non-exhaustive) fairness factors,79 has since been followed up with
several other changes to Canada’s fair dealing regime. Bill C-11, the Copyright
Modernization Act,80 introduced several new fair dealing exemptions which are
discussed below. The new exemptions for education, parody and satire,81 and non-
commercial user-generated content82 supplement the pre-existing fair dealing cate-
gories of research or private study,83 criticism or review,84 and news reporting85
which were at issue in CCH. Further, in July 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada
decided five copyright cases in a sequence of decisions dubbed the “copyright
pentalogy”.86 The pentalogy strongly affirmed the importance of balancing users’
rights and creators’ rights in Canadian copyright law.87 These decisions also en-
dorsed the principle of technological neutrality.88
Given Canada’s fair dealing structure, it seems the categories that existed prior
to Bill C-11 may have been inadequate as a defense for fan writers. Although Can-
ada’s fair dealing regime was quite flexible even before the recent reforms,89 and
although CCH emphasized the importance of balancing creators’ and users’
rights,90 the first step of the fair dealing analysis nevertheless requires that dealings
be for an exempted purpose enumerated in the Act.91 In other words, in order to
have a chance of being fair, dealings with copyrighted works must first “fit” within
one of the exempted categories or purposes.92 Although the Court in CCH held that
79 CCH, supra note 76 at paras. 53–60.
80 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 38.
81 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.
82 Ibid. at s. 29.21.
83 Ibid. at s. 29.
84 Ibid. at s. 29.1.
85 Ibid. at s. 29.2.
86 The copyright pentalogy consists of: Public Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012
SCC 34, 2012 CarswellNat 2376, 2012 CarswellNat 2377 (S.C.C.) [ESA], Public
Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 35, 2012 CarswellNat 2378, 2012 Car-
swellNat 2379 (S.C.C.) [Rogers], Public Performance of Sound Recordings, Re, 2012
SCC 38, 2012 CarswellNat 2383, 2012 CarswellNat 2382 (S.C.C.) [Re:Sound], Public
Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 36, 2012 CarswellNat 2380, 2012 Car-
swellNat 2381 (S.C.C.) [SOCAN], and Alberta (Minister of Education) v. Canadian
Copyright Licensing Agency, 2012 SCC 37, 2012 CarswellNat 2419, 2012 CarswellNat
2420 (S.C.C.) [Alberta (Education)].
87 See e.g. Michael Geist, ed, “Introduction”, in The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Su-
preme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 2013) at iii.
88 Ibid. at iv.
89 D’Agostino, supra note 76 at 326 and 332.
90 CCH, supra note 76 at paras. 48-49.
91 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 42-43.
92 See Esmail, supra note 76 at 18; see also Reynolds, ibid.
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these categories should be given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation,93 it
is unlikely that much (perhaps most) fan fiction could fall within the ambit of the
original categories. As Reynolds concludes,94 fan fiction works that are distributed
in public settings (e.g. online fan sites) are unlikely to qualify as private study, even
if fan fiction that is not distributed publicly might.95 Reynolds also notes that news
reports sometimes discuss and may even excerpt or include rewrites or fan fiction,
but it is unlikely that many fan fiction works are written for the purpose of news
reporting.96
Similarly, although “research” need not be private,97 it could be difficult to
classify at least some fan fiction as research. Perhaps writers who use fan fiction to
learn writing skills could successfully argue that they write these works for re-
search purposes. However, this argument may not apply to all fan fiction works.
Reynolds concludes that “it is unlikely [. . .] that the majority of rewrites are cre-
ated for the purpose of research”.98
At first, the criticism and review category appears more promising. As Reyn-
olds notes, some rewrites — including fan fiction works — are critical of source
texts.99 However, Reynolds argues that those works that criticize earlier texts may
be effectively termed parodies,100 which some jurisprudence suggests are beyond
the scope of the original criticism exemption.101 It is difficult to determine whether
the criticism category would still exclude parodies in light of the broad approach to
users’ rights endorsed in CCH.102 Further, the Copyright Modernization Act’s addi-
tion of a distinct parody and satire category may suggest that the original criticism
exemption did not in fact include parodies or satires, and that Parliament intended
to correct that omission by protecting parodic and satirical works as fair dealing in
future.103 However, even if the old criticism category could include some parodic
works, not all fan fiction stories are critical or parodic.104 Non-critical fan works
93 CCH, supra note 76 at paras. 48-49, 50-51 and 54; see also Reynolds, “Impact”, supra
note 7 at 42–44.
94 Reynolds, ibid.
95 Reynolds, ibid., at 43; see also Hager v. ECW Press Ltd. (1998), 1998 CarswellNat
2568, 1998 CarswellNat 3031, [1999] 2 F.C. 287 (Fed. T.D.) at para 55, holding that
“research” and “private study” should not be communicated to the public. I note, how-
ever, that this case was decided several years before CCH and that its directions may
no longer apply to private study or research.
96 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 44.
97 See CCH, supra note 76 at para. 51; see also SOCAN, supra note 86 at paras. 34–36.
98 Reynolds, “Impact” supra note 7, at 43.
99 Ibid. at 44-45.
100 Ibid. at 44.
101 See Cie générale des établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada
(1996), [1997] 2 F.C. 306, 1996 CarswellNat 2297, 1996 CarswellNat 2711 (Fed.
T.D.), cited in Reynolds, “Impact”, supra at 44-45 [Michelin]; see also Graham Reyn-
olds, “Towards a Right”, supra note 22 at 406.
102 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 45.
103 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.
104 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 45.
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(for example, fan fiction stories that celebrate and/or continue a popular saga with
no critical intent) may fall outside even a liberal interpretation of the criticism
category.
It is likewise difficult to determine how useful the “review” category would be
for fan fiction writers. Jurisprudence suggests that the term review entails some
commentary or value judgment on the original copyrighted work.105 Some fan sto-
ries may comment or offer value judgments on source texts, but it is unclear
whether a court would be — or would have been — willing to include such critical
or parodic second generation texts in the review category. Furthermore, not all fan
fiction works necessarily comment or offer any value judgments on the parent
texts; the review category may be inapplicable to these non-critical works.
In conclusion, even when given a liberal interpretation, the original fair deal-
ing categories may not encompass all fan fiction works. Many fan fiction works are
posted to public online forums, and probably would not qualify as private study.
Further, fan writers may or may not be able to fit their writing into the category of
research. That defense may apply to writers who use fan fiction as a means of
learning writing skills; however, it is possible that more advanced writers write fan
fiction for other purposes. The category of news reporting seems equally inapplica-
ble to most fan fiction works. Finally, the criticism and review categories may not
encompass non-critical fan stories, even if the exemption could apply to criti-
cal/parodic works. Canada’s original fair dealing categories therefore appear inade-
quate for many fan fiction writers. Happily, recent additions to the Copyright Act
seem more hospitable to fan narratives.
(c) New fair dealing factors and exemptions and fan fiction
Before examining the relevant new fair dealing provisions, it is worth looking
at the fair dealing factors upheld in CCH.106 These factors may be more helpful
and more readily applicable to fan fiction works than the fair dealing categories.
While it may be difficult for fan fiction writers to fit their works into the original
fair dealing categories, an analysis of the fair dealing factors could be more favour-
able to fan fiction, provided a court were to reach this stage of the test. This dis-
crepancy highlights one key difference between Canadian fair dealing and Ameri-
can fair use. In the US, works need not be for a specific purpose in order to be
fair.107 Instead, courts must apply the US fair use factors in order to determine
whether a given use is fair, regardless of the potentially infringing work’s pur-
pose.108 Rebecca Tushnet has analyzed fan fiction’s status as per the American fair
use factors.109 She argues that fan fiction is generally fair use, highlighting in par-
ticular the transformative and non-commercial nature of fan works110 and the fact
105 Canada v. James Lorimer & Co. (April 30, 1982), Doc. T-2216-81, [1982] F.C.J. No.
229 (Fed. T.D.) at para. 15.
106 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 53.
107 17 USC §107; see also D’Agostino, supra note 76 at 337.
108 17 USC §107; see also D’Agostino, ibid.
109 Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14.
110 Ibid. at 664-665.
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that fan works typically do not threaten the markets for the original texts they draw
on.111 Canada’s fair dealing factors are similar though not identical to their Ameri-
can counterparts. I believe that Canada’s fair dealing factors would be equally fa-
vourable to fan fiction, now that new fair dealing categories such as parody might
finally allow a court to reach this stage of the analysis. Additionally, while the fair
dealing factors upheld in CCH are not exhaustive,112 they provide a helpful frame-
work for analyzing a potential defense of fan fiction writing. I therefore set down
some speculation as to how fan fiction might fare under the CCH factors.
The CCH fair dealing factors are as follows:113 “(1) the purpose of the deal-
ing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives
to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the
work.”114 Some of these factors have been discussed further in jurisprudence after
CCH, such as the pentalogy, which I mention where appropriate.115
Per CCH, the first factor, the purpose of the dealing (i.e., whether the dealing
is for an enumerated purpose),116 should be given a liberal interpretation, as noted
above.117 It is under this factor that courts must consider whether the dealing is for
commercial or non-commercial ends;118 non-commercial dealings are more likely
to be fair, though the defense does not exclude commercial dealings.119 Courts
must consider the purpose and perspective of the end user of the materials.120
While fan fiction may be difficult to fit into the original purposes, a liberal interpre-
tation of the new exemptions for parody and satire could encompass at least some
fan fiction writers, as I suggest below. Moreover, it is also important to consider the
non-commercial purposes of fan fiction writers. Fan fiction’s (typically) amateur
and non-profit nature could suggest fair dealing.
The second factor is the character of the dealing. Under this factor, the Su-
preme Court in CCH stated that courts must consider how the original work is dealt
with.121 In CCH, the Court gives the example of a user making and redistributing
multiple copies of a work as a factor that would suggest unfair dealing;122 destroy-
ing copies of an original after use, by contrast, would suggest fair dealing,123 as
would using a single copy of a work for legitimate purposes.124 These particular
111 Ibid. at 669-670.
112 See e.g. Esmail, supra note 76 at 18-19; CCH, supra note 76 at para. 53.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 See, for example, Alberta (Education), supra note 86, and SOCAN, supra note 86.
116 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 54.
117 Ibid. at para. 51; see also D’Agostino, supra note 76 at 320-321.
118 CCH, supra note 76.
119 Ibid. at para. 54.
120 Alberta (Education), supra note 86 at para. 22-23; see also SOCAN, supra note 86 at
para. 34.
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examples do not seem to contemplate fan fiction or other fan-made media. While
fan fiction may be publically distributed, and some stories may even be widely
read, the practice normally does not involve or require redistributing copies of the
original media on which such stories are based, nor do fan fiction stories seek to
substitute their content for that of the canon works.125 The fact that fan fiction
authors seem to consume media — books, movies, or television shows — legiti-
mately126 and produce new stories that are unlikely to usurp the originals could
support a finding of fairness.
The “character” factor also contemplates the “custom or practice in a particu-
lar trade or industry to determine whether or not the character of the dealing is
fair”.127 This factor could privilege certain voices in litigation.128 Copyright own-
ers who oppose fan fiction may feel that the practice is inherently unfair dealing.
However, a court relying on the perspectives and practices of fan communities
themselves might conclude that fan fiction is fair.129 It is unclear whether this fac-
tor, like the dealing’s purpose, must be assessed from the perspective of the end
users and their customs. Neither Alberta (Education) nor Society of Authors,
Composers and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell explicitly imports the “end
user’s perspective” language into the second factor or gives much guidance on this
factor at all. However, if this analysis took into account fan practices, then fan
customs such as using fan fiction to celebrate works, explicitly attributing works to
their creators and rights holders,130 and emphasizing non-commerciality could lead
to a finding of fairness.
The third factor, the amount of the dealing, requires an analysis of the quantity
as well as the importance of the material taken from the original work.131 The Su-
preme Court reiterates that “if the amount taken [. . .] is trivial, then the fair dealing
analysis need not be undertaken at all” because the trivial taking will not infringe
copyright.132 This statement may be encouraging for fan writers who draw only a
trivial amount, such as a single background character, from source texts.133 Moreo-
ver, while the quantity taken can indicate fairness, the Court contemplates that
dealings involving entire works may nevertheless be fair.134 Later jurisprudence
has clarified that the amount of the dealing must be considered in proportion to the
125 See Chua, supra note 16; see also Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 669–674.
126 Chua, supra note 16.
127 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 55.
128 D’Agostino, supra note 76 at 321.
129 Ibid.
130 Online fan communities often acknowledge the authors of the original works that have
inspired fan stories or fan sites. Rebecca Tushnet has argued that this practice or cus-
tom is an appeal to common sense notions of justice in the application of copyright
law; see Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14.
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whole of the original work.135 This factor, like the others, is highly sensitive to the
facts and context of each alleged infringement. However, as I have noted, fan fic-
tion stories seldom reproduce source texts wholesale. While some stories may es-
sentially plagiarize the original narrative while adding very little of the fan author’s
creation, most such works borrow characters and settings in order to tell new sto-
ries, add the fan author’s insights or perspectives, or challenge the parent text.
Would fan fiction stories telling new adventures of a beloved character such as
Harry Potter be fair, given that Harry the character is only one aspect of the lengthy
Harry Potter saga? Would considering the length of the new fan fiction story be
appropriate as well, such that using only a few pre-existing elements to write a
longer fan story might be “more” fair? It is very difficult to determine how particu-
lar fan fiction works might fare on this factor. Each individual story would be sub-
ject to a different legal analysis and, potentially, different treatment.
The fourth factor, alternatives to the dealing, is another factor where fairness
may be in the eye of the beholder. As in the character of the dealing, courts
privileging different perspectives may reach different conclusions. Copyright hold-
ers might allege that fan authors always have alternatives to dealing with copy-
righted works; namely, they could write completely original stories and share those,
rather than drawing characters or settings from existing texts. A court that accepted
this contention might conclude that all fan fiction writers have this alternative, and
may be less likely to view fan fiction as fair dealing. However, fan writers would
ask whether there really are practical alternatives to the dealing in question. One
can hardly celebrate, expand, or critique a specific well-loved and well-known
work without referencing it.
Case law in the wake of CCH suggests that alternatives that are impractical or
that do not allow users to achieve a specific purpose, but only a broadly similar
purpose, do not lead to a finding of unfairness.136 Both Alberta (Education) and
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers Canada (SOCAN) apply the
alternatives factor in a liberal way that respects the specific needs of end users and
that is in keeping with CCH’s broad approach to user rights. In Alberta (Educa-
tion), the Supreme Court found it unreasonable to expect schools to distribute cop-
ies of multiple textbooks to all students when teachers wanted only to assign short
excerpts from supplementary materials.137 This approach suggests that users need
not avail themselves of impractical alternatives to the dealing in question in order
to benefit from the fair dealing defense. Similarly, in SOCAN, the Supreme Court
rejected SOCAN’s contention that service providers and consumers avail them-
selves of impractical alternatives to previewing songs.138 Alternatives such as of-
fering customer reviews, album art, or store return policies did not allow users to
achieve the specific purpose of previewing songs before purchasing them. Al-
lowing users to listen to short clips of songs was therefore held to be fair dealing
for the purpose of research, even though (inferior) alternative options were availa-
ble to consumers. This user-centric and liberal approach which permits end users to
135 SOCAN, supra note 86 at paras. 40-41.
136 Ibid. at paras. 44–46; Alberta (Education) at paras. 31-32.
137 Ibid.
138 SOCAN, supra note 86 at paras. 44–46.
FAN FICTION AND CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW   91
pursue specific goals — such as, perhaps, paying homage to or parodying specific
copyrighted works — could be favourable to fan writers.
The fifth factor is the nature of the work.139 Per CCH, disseminating an un-
known and unpublished work with proper attribution is more likely to be fair be-
cause this dealing promotes wider public dissemination of works.140 It is unclear,
however, how this direction might affect fan fiction. Fan fiction writers are unlikely
to write about unpublished or unheard of works. On the contrary, most fan fiction
focuses on popular media with broad fan bases, such as Harry Potter or Twilight.
While the Internet is also home to fan fiction based on more obscure source texts or
“fandoms”, these works have clearly been published and are not completely un-
known.141 Would the nature of the work require making a distinction between
these two scenarios? Should the fan who has written her own sequel to an obscure
but cherished independent film be treated differently than one who has written an
eighth Harry Potter novel? This may seem an unfair and arbitrary distinction to
fans. Furthermore, fan fiction, like other forms of online fan discourse, may pique
or enhance interest in original works.142 While Twilight, Star Wars, or Harry Pot-
ter may “need” this publicity less than more obscure works do, fan fiction can en-
hance public knowledge of the original work in either case. The Court’s statement
that dealings which enhance public knowledge of works are more likely to be fair
could thus apply to — and argue in favour of — many fan fiction stories, regardless
of their source texts.
The final fair dealing factor is the effect of the dealing on the copyrighted
work and its market.143 This factor was described as an important one, though it is
“neither the only factor nor the most important” in assessing whether a dealing is
fair.144 A finding that a dealing is likely to compete with the market for the original
work suggests that the dealing is unfair.145 This, however, is not typically true of
fan fiction. Potential Harry Potter readers are unlikely to mistake online fan stories
featuring Harry for the Harry Potter books, or to content themselves with reading
fan fiction instead of reading (or completing) the original series. It seems equally
unlikely that a rights holder critical of fan fiction would be able to produce evi-
dence showing that his or her market was directly and adversely affected by fan
139 CCH, supra note 86 at para. 53.
140 Ibid. at para. 58. D’Agostino notes that this approach is a departure from previous Ca-
nadian practices, and contrasts with practices in the United States and the United King-
dom: see D’Agostino, supra note 76 at 322.
141 Tushnet, “Copyright Law, Fan Practices”, supra note 1 at 63.
142 See e.g. Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 669-670. McKay also examines
the ways in which some copyright owners, such as Lucasfilm Ltd., have recognized the
promotional benefits of fan creativity and experimented with hosting (carefully se-
lected and controlled) fan works on official web sites and forums; see McKay, supra
note 1 at 123-124; see also Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture (New York: New
York University Press, 2006) at 152–157.
143 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 59.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
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fiction.146 If anything, fan fiction communities may serve as an additional form of
publicity and thus make readers more likely to remain excited about the parent
franchises, or to explore other, similar published works that seem equally popular
in fan circles.
Furthermore, even if the opposite effect might apply in some cases — theoreti-
cally, some individuals may confuse fan works with original texts or develop dis-
taste for the originals through exposure to fan works which they dislike — these
situations are likely to be rare and minor. Although the Supreme Court of Canada
has not addressed this question, American jurisprudence has considered the issues
of non-commercial use, market substitution, and market suppression in relation to
fair use and, especially, parodies.147 The fourth American fair use factor looks at
146 CCH and subsequent decisions seem to require that rights holders demonstrate direct
market harm; see CCH cited in Alberta (Education), supra note 86 at paras. 35–37. In
Alberta (Education) in particular, the Court suggests that the rights holder must show
that the dealing in question caused a reduction in sales (and not simply that sales or
revenues diminished). As of this writing, it seems that there is no existing research
specifically focusing on the economic effects — harmful or otherwise — of Western
fan fiction. This may make it difficult for rights holders to discharge their burden and
produce evidence that fan fiction results in economic harms. However, it also makes it
difficult to cite academic evidence that demonstrates that fan fiction is an economically
neutral or beneficial practice for rights owners. Nevertheless, some researchers have
examined the economic effects of closely related phenomena. Lawrence Lessig, in his
book Free Culture (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), discusses the phenomenon
of Japanese doujinshi. Doujinshi are commercial derivative or second generation texts
based on first generation comic books or manga: see Lessig, pp. 27-28. Although
doujinshi technically infringe Japanese copyright law, they are broadly tolerated and
constitute an important part of the total comics market. Doujinshi are analogous to fan
fiction in that they are written by second generation creators who draw upon — but
transform — first generation manga works. The markets for derivative doujinshi and
original manga flourish in parallel with one another, largely because doujinshi, like fan
fiction works, must of necessity offer some novel perspective on or addition to the first
generation texts and thus do not serve as mere substitutes. Similarly, Ernest Chua,
supra note 16, canvased what seems to be a small sample of fan fiction writers, who
remain devoted to following and purchasing canon texts despite the fact that they read
and write fan adaptations as well. Other researchers have likewise looked at fan com-
munities’ commitment to non-commerciality and “gift culture”; see e.g. Karen Hellek-
son, “A Fannish Field of Value: Online Fan Gift Culture” (2009) 48:4 Cinema Journal
113; see also Abigail De Kosnick, “Should Fan Fiction Be Free?” (2009) 48:4 Cinema
Journal 118. Finally, the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office commissioned
a study on the economic effects of music video parodies; see Kris Erickson et al, “Cop-
yright and the Economic Effects of Parody: An Empirical Study of Music Videos on
the YouTube Platform and an Assessment of the Regulatory Options”, online: Intellec-
tual Property Office, <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/>. Although this study explicitly notes
that it does not include other forms of fan-created content such as fan fiction — phe-
nomena which could benefit from further research — the study found that fan-made
music video parodies did no economic harm to copyright holders.
147 See e.g. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, supra note 14; see also Tushnet, “Legal Fic-
tions”, supra note 14 at 663.
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the commercial nature of a use and its effects on the market for the original.148 In
the US context, commercial use creates a presumption of market effect, while non-
commercial use “shifts the burden to the plaintiff” to demonstrate that economic
harm is likely.149 Transformative uses create a similar presumption against market
harm, “because transformation precludes simple market substitution”.150 American
law recognizes that some fair uses, such as negative reviews and critical parodies,
may suppress demand for a work, but that such a market reduction is not the same
as market substitution.151 Rare instances in which fan fiction may dampen rather
than enhance consumers’ enthusiasm for the source material should be considered
analogous to these reviews or parodies, and should not be considered evidence that
fan fiction as a whole is harmful to the markets for copyrighted works, or is an
unfair dealing.
Canada’s fair dealing factors could, therefore, support a finding that fan fiction
is fair dealing. While the original fair dealing categories — research and private
study, criticism or review, and news reporting — may not have readily encom-
passed fan fiction, new categories seem more promising, with certain caveats. The
Copyright Modernization Act added “education, parody or satire” to the general fair
dealing exception in section 29 of the Copyright Act,152 which previously included
only research and private study. It is difficult to speculate as to whether fan fiction
writers may bring their work into the education category — for example, by argu-
ing that their amateur writing allows them to learn writing skills. Further, the scope
of this article makes it difficult to delve into the viability of this argument, which
may be as much a “stretch” as applying the research and private study category to
(at least some) fan fiction would be. I therefore turn instead to a brief discussion of
the parody and satire exemption, which appears more applicable to second genera-
tion creative works and more relevant to fan writers.
Given the novelty of the parody and satire provision, it is not easy at present to
gauge what the provision’s parameters will be and what sorts of works it will ulti-
mately protect. On its face, this new fair dealing category appears to encompass at
least some fan works, i.e., those that “parody” or “satirize” the canon texts. But
these terms are not self-explanatory, nor do they provide much guidance as to
which second generation works fall within their ambit. Graham Reynolds notes that
the term “parody” can have several meanings.153 US and Canadian courts have
sometimes defined parodies as generally humorous works that mimic particular
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid at 670. I note that the concept of transformativeness is an American notion, and
not an aspect of Canadian fair dealing. However, the final Canadian fair dealing factor
does suggest that it is appropriate to consider whether or not a second work may substi-
tute for the first. As transformation makes direct substitution less likely, it may be
worthwhile to look at American guidance and to import the American terminology.
151 See e.g. Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 663.
152 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.
153 Graham Reynolds, “Necessarily Critical? The Adoption of a Parody Defense to Copy-
right Infringement in Canada” (2009) 33:2 Man LJ 243 at 244-245 [Reynolds, “Neces-
sarily Critical”].
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texts, authors, genres, or styles in order to mock them.154 The Quebec Court of
Appeal, for example, considered several definitions of parody in Productions
Avanti Ciné-Vidéo Inc. v. Favreau.155 All the definitions cited in that case resemble
the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms’s definition in that they conceive of par-
ody as “a mocking imitation of the style of a literary work or works, ridiculing the
stylistic habits of an author or school by exaggerated mimicry.”156 However, as I
note below, the elements of these definitions are not present in all fan fiction
works. Further, as Reynolds argues, they are not even necessarily true of all paro-
dies, which may not always be critical, humorous, or mocking.157
The Avanti decision is unique in that it seemed open to accepting (some) paro-
dies as a form of criticism, even prior to CCH and to the addition of a distinct fair
dealing category of parody and satire.158 In Avanti, a copyright owner sued an adult
film producer for infringing its copyright in a popular Quebec sitcom, La Petite
Vie. The defendant film producer was found to have reproduced a substantial part
of the original television show, including its setting, set design, costumes, musical
score and characters.159 The defendant alleged that his film was a parody of La
Petite Vie and thus fair use for the purpose of criticism.160 While the Court did not
outright reject the notion that criticism could encompass parody,161 it found that
the defendant’s film did not qualify. Per the Court, the film lacked the requisite
intent to criticize La Petite Vie. Its creators were held to have reproduced aspects of
the original show simply to cash in on the original’s popularity162 and/or to avoid
the intellectual work of inventing their own creative elements.163
As I note above, Avanti pre-dates CCH, the 2012 pentalogy of decisions
(which affirmed CCH’s large and liberal approach to fair dealing) and the Copy-
right Modernization Act. The directions in this case may therefore be only mini-
mally relevant to future Canadian parody decisions. However, the decision is some-
what troubling for defenders of fan fiction. Indeed, any definition of parody that
insists on a critical and mocking intent and an exaggerated or humorous tone may
limit the exemption’s utility for fan writers. Some fan works may have a clearly
critical bent that will satisfy a court, but this is unlikely to be true of all fan fiction
stories. For example, some Twilight fans may wish to “write back” to that franchise
154 Ibid. at 244.
155 Productions Avanti Ciné-Vidéo Inc. c. Favreau, [1999] R.J.Q. 1939, 177 D.L.R. (4th)
568, 1999 CarswellQue 2742, 1999 CarswellQue 4718 (C.A. Que.); leave to appeal
refused 2000 CarswellQue 947, 2000 CarswellQue 946 (S.C.C.) at para. 75 [Avanti].
156 Chris Baldick, The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 3d ed (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), sv “parody”.
157 Reynolds, “Necessarily Critical”, supra note 153 at 244-245.
158 Ibid. at 250.
159 Avanti, supra note 155 at para. 54
160 Ibid. at para. 19.
161 In this respect, this decision contrasts with other pre-CCH and pre-Copyright Moderni-
zation Act decisions such as Michelin, supra note 101, cited in Reynolds, “Necessarily
Critical”, supra note 153 at 248-249.
162 Avanti, supra note 155 at para. 20.
163 Ibid. at para. 61.
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by mocking the heroine’s slavish devotion to her vampire boyfriend. Other fans,
however, might wish to write further — and completely uncritical — adventures
for these characters or other cherished figures from popular media. A judge who
looked to Avanti or who drew closely upon a dictionary definition of parody might
be unwilling to consider fan sequels, homages, poetry, and other fan fiction works
to be parodies. Further, courts looking to Avanti could accuse fan writers of repro-
ducing substantial parts of canon texts to avoid creating their own worlds or to
benefit from the source texts’ popularity, and not for the purpose of criticizing the
original texts. The broad and liberal interpretation urged in CCH and the pentalogy
could argue against such restrictive readings, but it is too early to know if this will
be the case. The parody exception, though a positive step, may not adequately ad-
dress the needs of all fan writers in Canada. I note, further, that while parody
(though an imperfect defense) seems most relevant to fan fiction, similar considera-
tions apply to the satire exemption. Satire may be defined as a “mode of writing
that exposes the failings of individuals, institutions or societies to ridicule and
scorn.”164 While some fan fiction stories may use aspects of popular culture and
copyrighted texts to ridicule social institutions, it is unlikely that all or even most
fan stories would fit this definition.
Finally, the new fair dealing category of parody and satire suffers the peren-
nial drawbacks of fair dealing and fair use in that it is a reactive, uncertain, and
highly contextualized defense. Procedurally, fair dealing, like American fair use,
must be raised as a defense to an infringement complaint;165 fans cannot state in
advance that their dealings with source texts are meant to be fair,166 or proactively
comply with specific conditions in order to ensure that their works constitute fair
dealing or fair use. Furthermore, the fair dealing factors require such a deeply con-
textual analysis that it is almost impossible to know if a given dealing is “fair” until
the issue has gone to trial and a judgment has been handed down. While I believe
the CCH factors support a finding that most non-commercial fan fiction is fair deal-
ing, this analysis is nevertheless speculative, given the fair dealing regime’s lack of
ex ante certainty. With these drawbacks in mind, I turn to a possible “unlikely
hero” for fan authors in Canada — the new user-generated content exemption, sec-
tion 29.21 of the Copyright Act.167
III. BRINGING FAN FICTION WITHIN THE NEW USER-
GENERATED CONTENT EXEMPTION
The non-commercial user-generated content (“UGC”) provision enacted in the
Copyright Modernization Act strongly resembles the UGC clause in Bill C-11’s
immediate predecessor, Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, which died
164 The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, supra note 156, sv “satire”.
165 See CCH, supra note 76 at para. 48; for the American fair use context, see Jacqueline
D Lipton, “Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire
Blogosphere” (2011) 70 Md L Rev 1 at 25-26.
166 See e.g. ibid. at 22-23 on the legal ineffectiveness of fan “disclaimers”.
167 Copyright Act, supra note 89 at s. 29.21.
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on the Order Paper.168 In the following section, I will draw on the debates on Bill
C-32 as well as Bill C-11 when referring to the Parliamentary discourse surround-
ing the “UGC” exemption. Taken together, the new parody and satire exemptions
and the user-generated content provision have the potential to make Canada a
leader in protecting non-commercial second generation creative works. Moreover,
as I suggest above, the UGC provision may be particularly interesting and advanta-
geous in this regard. It is therefore worth examining whether and how fan fiction
may come within its ambit. To do so, I attempt to interpret the provision as it could
be applied to fan fiction. I draw, in a general sense, on Driedger’s “modern” princi-
ple of statutory interpretation as invoked in CCH and other Canadian decisions.169
The modern principle entails reading “the words of an Act [. . .] in their entire con-
text and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.170 Given the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s move towards accepting Parliamentary and legislative
materials as aids to interpretation,171 and given the lively and highly public Parlia-
mentary discourse on copyright reform, I also draw on a variety of legislative
materials in arguing that the UGC provision ought to encompass fan fiction. The
following analysis focuses primarily on analysing the language of section 29.21
before moving on to assess its context, intentions and objects, and the principles
that underlie it.
(a) Can the language of section 29.21 extend to fan fiction?
The user-generated content exemption reads as follows: 
29.21 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has been pub-
lished or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new
work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the indivi-
dual — or, with the individual’s authorization, a member of their house-
hold — to use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an inter-
mediary to disseminate it, if
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work
or other subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial
purposes;
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the au-
thor, performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or
168 Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010. Bill C-11 was
the last, and C-32 the second-to-last, of several copyright reforms proposed in Parlia-
ment since 2005: see also Bill C-61, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 2nd Sess, 39th
Parl, 2008 (first reading 12 June 2008) and Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright
Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first reading 20 June 2005).
169 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 9; see also Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 41.
170 Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002
CarswellBC 852, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.), at para 26, cited in CCH, supra note 76
at para. 9.
171 Sullivan, supra note 169 at 280–283.
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other subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasona-
ble in the circumstances to do so;
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the ex-
isting work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may
be, was not infringing copyright; and
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work
or other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect,
financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploita-
tion of the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of
it — or on an existing or potential market for it, including that
the new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the
existing one.
[. . .]
(2) The following definitions apply in subsection (1).
[. . .] “intermediary” means a person or entity who regularly provides space
or means for works or other subject-matter to be enjoyed by the public.
[. . .] “use” means to do anything that by this Act the owner of the copyright
has the sole right to do, other than the right to authorize anything.172
This provision has been referred to as the “YouTube” or “mash-up exception”
in Parliament173 and in the public discourse surrounding the copyright reforms.174
In debates in Parliament,175 for example, the bill’s sponsor invoked the wholesome
example of parents who upload a video of their children dancing to popular music
when discussing the UGC provision’s aims and scope.176 Sponsor Christian Para-
dis also contemplated the creation of “original mixes of songs and videos”177 as
another type of content which the UGC provision will protect;178 importantly, Min-
ister Paradis suggested in his comments that copyright holders may actually benefit
from this sort of non-commercial online exposure.179
However, while the debates in Parliament generally assumed that the UGC
provision protects amateur videos posted to YouTube or similar sites, the provision
does not specify or limit the types of content or media that it will encompass. This
172 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21.
173 See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 51 (22 November 2011) at
1714 (Elizabeth May).
174 See e.g. Michael Geist, “What the New Copyright Law Means For You” (13 November
2012) (blog post), online: MichaelGeist.ca,
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6695/135>; see also Daniel Gervais, “User-
Generated Content and Music File Sharing: A Look at Some of the More Interesting
Aspects of Bill C-32” in From Radical Extremism to Balanced Copyright (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2010) at 448[User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing] .
175 See, for example, sponsor Christian Paradis’ comments when moving that Bill C-11 be
read a second time, House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 31 (18 October
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is an important step for creators of fan fiction and other forms of amateur derivative
content besides mash-up videos. The words of section 29.21, given their ordinary
and grammatical meaning and read in the context of the Act, appear to accommo-
date fan fiction quite readily. Section 29.21(1) speaks of any individual who uses
“an existing work or subject-matter or copy of one” in the creation of “a new work”
in which copyright could subsist.180 The definition of “use” in s. 29.21(2) encom-
passes “[doing] anything [. . .] that the owner of the copyright has the sole right to
do”,181 other than authorizing anything. Although not all fan fiction stories would
necessarily infringe copyright, many may reproduce substantial parts of existing
works182 by drawing characters, plots, background events, settings, and other sig-
nificant aspects from first generation texts. Fan fiction writers who reproduce sub-
stantial parts of existing works could therefore be said to “use” those copyrighted
works per the definition in section 29.21(2).
Similarly, the phrase “the creation of a new work” as used in 29.21(1), when
given its ordinary and grammatical sense, seems to encompass the creation of many
possible types of work, in different media; it is in no way limited to audiovisual
content. “An existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one”183 would also
appear to encompass a wide range of original copyrighted works, rather than the
audiovisual media which video makers typically draw upon. A fan fiction story
based on a novel, film, or television show is as much a “new work” drawing on an
“existing work [. . .] which has been published” as a YouTube mash-up video in-
corporating previously released video footage and/or music would be.
Furthermore, while it may be strange to think of copyright subsisting in fan
fiction stories — works which can, themselves, be accused of infringing the copy-
right of others — fan fiction may indeed qualify for copyright protection. Canadian
law has a relatively low threshold for finding that copyright subsists in a work.184
Many fan fiction stories could meet the criteria for copyright protection as estab-
lished in CCH.185 CCH held that: 
[for] a work to be “original” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, it
must be more than a mere copy of another work. At the same time, it need
not be creative, in the sense of being novel or unique. What is required to
attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise of
skill and judgment. [. . .] The exercise of skill and judgment required to pro-
duce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a
purely mechanical exercise [. . .].186
Writing a work of fiction is an exercise of skill and judgment, even if the
author borrows elements from earlier texts, as in the case of fan fiction (or other
rewrites). Further, the skill and judgment seem to be non-trivial in the case of most
fan fiction works, which typically engage previously published texts in order to tell
180 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid. at s 3.
183 Ibid. at s. 29.21.
184 See e.g. Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 52-53.
185 CCH, supra note 76 at para. 16.
186 Ibid.
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new stories and express the fan author’s ideas or insights. Fan fiction stories should
therefore generally meet the skill and judgment test necessary to qualify as origi-
nal — and copyrightable — works in Canada. Further, some commentators have
suggested that under Canadian law, copyright may subsist even in works which are
themselves infringing.187 Fan fiction could therefore come within the ordinary
sense of “a new work[s] or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists,”188
per section 29.21(1).
A close reading of the later subsections in section 29.21 suggests that these
clauses, too, can extend to fan fiction. Fan fiction stories are typically disseminated
via intermediaries, such as fan web sites or online fan fiction archives; these in-
termediaries “[provide] space or means for works or other subject-matter to be en-
joyed by the public”189 on any reading of the phrase in its ordinary and grammati-
cal sense. Moreover, online archives for written content are analogous to YouTube
and other social media sites through which users share audiovisual media, and
which Parliament specifically contemplated in enacting sections 29.21(1) and
29.21(1)(a).190 Similarly, the dissemination of non-profit fan fiction on freely ac-
cessible sites should come within the meaning of “non-commercial purposes” as
per section 29.21(1)(a).
Additionally, section 29.21(1)(b) requires that creators of user-generated con-
tent mention “the source — and [. . .] the name of the author, performer, maker or
broadcaster — of the existing work” where it is appropriate to do so.191 As Tushnet
suggests, fan fiction writers often mention the source text on which they base their
work and its author, maker, or other rights holders in “disclaimers” preceding fan
works.192 This fan practice would fit within the words and the condition in section
29.21(1)(b). As well, this practice is analogous to similar practices on websites
geared toward the audiovisual materials which Parliament contemplated. There is
little difference between a disclaimer preceding a Harry Potter fan story and recog-
nizing J.K. Rowling and Warner Brothers as the creators/rights holders, on one
hand, and a comparable disclaimer attributing “All My Loving” to the Beatles in a
YouTube montage that uses that song. Fan writers can comply with this provision
as easily as makers of other user-generated content can; in fact, it seems that they
often do include these acknowledgements.193 Where some fan stories may omit
story-specific disclaimers, it is nevertheless likely that these works will be posted to
online intermediaries that do credit the appropriate rights holders (for example, a
franchise-specific fan site that mentions the franchise’s creator/owner). The phrase
187 Gervais & Judge, supra note 42 at 52-53.
188 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21(1).
189 Ibid. at s. 29.21(2).
190 See again the sponsoring Minister’s references to YouTube and other video-sharing
sites, supra note 165; see also Elizabeth May’s critiques of the so-called “YouTube”
provision, supra note 163.
191 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21(1)(b).
192 Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 664.
193 Ibid.
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“where appropriate” and its implicit recognition that attribution may, sometimes, be
inappropriate or unnecessary could protect fan writers in these situations as well.194
While most of the provisions of section 29.21(1) are readily applicable to fan
literature, 29.21(1)(c) seems, at first, to be somewhat less relevant. This clause re-
quires that the user have reasonable grounds to believe the original copy of the
work which he or she draws on for his/her creations is a legitimate and non-infring-
ing copy. The wording of this particular subsection appears to contemplate audiovi-
sual content that draws images, footage, or music from specific copies of first gen-
eration works; users must take such clips from legitimately acquired copies of the
original media. It is more difficult to imagine how fan writers are to comply with
this subsection. While fan literature borrows characters, settings, events, or other
ideas from existing media, these borrowings are not taken directly from specific
copies of works in the same way a video clip or screen capture must be made from
a specific DVD. However, while this clause may betray the provision’s concern
with audiovisual media, it in no way excludes written or other content. Fan writers
may simply wish to ensure that they draw their inspiration from legitimate and non-
infringing copies of the works that have inspired them. In practice, it is likely that
fan fiction writers — serious and involved fans of a given franchise — generally
own legitimate copies of the books, movies, or games on which they base their
writing.195 This particular clause need not make the exemption inapplicable or less
applicable to written user-generated content.
The final condition or criteria in section 29.21(1)(d) looks at the potential
“substantial adverse effect [. . .] financial or otherwise” on the “exploitation or po-
tential exploitation of the existing work”.196 The clause effectively requires that
new user-generated works not harm the original works’ markets or potential mar-
kets, and not serve as “substitute[s] for the existing [works]”. I note here that sec-
tion 29.21(1)(d) incorporates the final CCH fair dealing factor of market effect; the
clause also raises considerations of market harm that are as applicable to fan litera-
ture as they are to the YouTube mash-ups and other audiovisual media that may
have inspired the UGC exemption directly. Can fan literature come within the con-
ditions in section 29.21(1)(d)? It appears so. As I argue above, second generation
fan fiction typically does not have a substantial adverse effect on first generation
works, nor do fan fiction stories serve as substitutes for the original franchises that
spawn them.197 The possibility that fan materials might occasionally be confused
with official materials or suppress some readers’ interest in the official materials
should not be considered “substantial adverse effects” on the original texts as those
words read in their ordinary and grammatical sense. Nor would such a reading befit
the context of Canada’s liberal approach to fair dealing.
Moreover, even where fan fiction stories may overlap with licensed sequels or
tie-ins that rights holders plan to develop, it is unlikely that fans will refuse to buy
the official tie-ins or sequels simply because they have encountered fan fiction ad-
194 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21(1)(b).
195 See Chua, supra note 16 at 223.
196 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at s. 29.21(1)(d).
197 See e.g. Chua, supra note 16 at 223; see also Lessig, supra note 146, on the phenome-
non of Japanese fan doujinshi.
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dressing a similar premise.198 The likely existence of Star Wars fan fiction explor-
ing Anakin Skywalker’s youth does not seem to have prevented fan fiction readers
and writers from watching the Star Wars “prequels”. Fans even read multiple fan
fiction stories together with licensed tie-in media offering different perspectives on
the same character and time period.199 In fact, the devoted fans who read and write
fan fiction are arguably more likely to follow treasured franchises closely than cas-
ual viewers are. I reiterate that fan fiction and other forms of fan-created content
can benefit rights holders by giving their work additional exposure and/or helping
to maintain interest in these works,200 a benefit which was even recognized in Par-
liament.201 Creators therefore should not fear substantial adverse impacts from fan
fiction. The lack of evidence demonstrating substantial market harm could bring
fan literature within the ambit of section 29.21(1)(d).
Some aspects of section 29.21(1)(d) could, nevertheless, pose challenges to
fan writers. At present, it is unclear what the interpretation and the impact of the
phrase “financial or otherwise” in section 29.21(1)(d) may be. Parliament does not
seem to have addressed this particular term in debating either Bill C-32 or C-11.
The words “or otherwise” could import consideration of possible non-financial
consequences of user-generated content, including fan fiction works. For instance,
rights holders may allege that certain fan stories or other user-generated content
create negative or unpalatable associations with their works (for example, if a fan
writer uses a popular franchise to weigh in on a controversial political issue, or
writes erotic works involving characters from a series originally aimed at younger
demographics). This phrase may allow rights holders to allege that fan works can
have adverse non-financial consequences such as interfering with the rights
holder’s creative control of a franchise or creating negative or controversial as-
sociations with the original text. The phrase “or otherwise” could therefore limit the
UGC provision’s utility to some fan creators, depending on how it will ultimately
be interpreted, what tests courts may develop, and where the burden of proof may
lie in litigation.202 A narrow reading of the UGC provision would probably not be
in keeping with the liberal approach to user rights articulated in CCH and upheld in
the pentalogy, but it remains to be seen how courts may address the possible non-
financial consequences of fan fiction and other fan created content.
To summarize, fan fiction is — fundamentally — user-generated content, in
that it is created by amateurs who use, reproduce, or borrow some elements of ex-
isting works to create new content of their own. While Parliament may have prima-
rily contemplated video content, and not fan fiction, in drafting the new UGC pro-
198 See, for example, Lai Chung on the ease with which audiences can consume and ex-
plore multiple visions or versions of a character; Lai Chung, supra note 44 at 930-931.
199 See e.g. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural
Theory of ‘Mary Sue’ Fan Fiction as Fair Use” (2007) 95 California L Rev 597 at 624.
200 See e.g. Tushnet, “Legal Fictions”, supra note 14 at 664; see also McKay, supra note
1; Jenkins, supra note 142.
201 See Minister Paradis’ comments at second reading, supra note 175.
202 For a further discussion of how burdens of proof may affect the availability of the UGC
provision to content creators, see Daniel Gervais, “User-Generated Content and Music
File-Sharing”, supra note 174 at 466.
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vision, the foregoing analysis should demonstrate that bringing fan fiction within
the context and the grammatical and ordinary meaning of section 29.21 requires no
significant stretch of the imagination or of the section’s wording. However, it is not
only the language of the new provision that seems to support including and insulat-
ing fan fiction along with other forms of user-generated content. The principles that
underlie this exemption are also highly relevant to fan fiction as one of many forms
of amateur, non-commercial derivative content that can be published online. In the
following section, I examine some of the apparent objectives and intentions of the
provision by looking at justifications for its inclusion, and argue that these princi-
ples would be ill-served by excluding written content.
(b) Principles, objectives and intentions: linking written fan fiction with
other user-generated content
In the Parliamentary debates on both C-11 and C-32, a number of Members
cited the importance of insulating amateur, non-commercial content users/creators
from copyright complaints by rights holders.203 Some Members implied that copy-
right law ought where possible to legitimize harmless activities which ordinary
Canadians engage in every day;204 others suggested that “kids”205 should not be
subject to legal actions by more powerful rights-holding actors.206 These state-
ments, from Government as well as Opposition Members, seem to recognize the
power imbalance that exists between non-commercial amateur content users on one
hand, and professional rights holders on the other. The ultimate inclusion of the
UGC exemption despite criticism from some stakeholders207 implies a commit-
ment to remedying this power imbalance and to protecting non-commercial second
generation creators who meet certain conditions. These laudable goals, however,
should not be restricted to creators of only some content. Writers of fan fiction, like
other amateur creators, are subject to the same power imbalances which may
threaten their hobby and their finances, should rights holders object to their non-
commercial writing. The family member who uploads a YouTube video of a child
dancing to pop music, for example, and the fan fiction writer who posts a short,
non-profit Harry Potter (or other) story online ought to be treated alike. To do less
would be arbitrary and unfair. The UGC provision is therefore commendable be-
203 See e.g. House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 (Evidence), 40th Parl,
3rd Sess (6 December 2010) at 1715 (Charlie Angus).
204 House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 123 (14 May 2012) at 1355 (Robert
Goguen).
205 Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 (Evidence), supra note 203.
206 Ibid.
207 See, for example, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking,
Trade and Finance, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Issue 23 (22 June 2012), in which Véronyque
Roy, legal counsel for the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois criticized the
practice for ignoring artists’ moral rights — and effectively legalizing all fan fiction;
see also House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-11 (Evidence), 41st Parl,
1st Sess (29 February 2012) at 1545, for a similar criticism from the Canadian Artists
Representation Copyright Collective Inc.
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cause it has the capacity to address and to protect all of these equally vulnerable
users — one of Parliament’s apparent intentions.
Further, interpreting the UGC provision so as to encompass fan fiction along-
side other types of content may be in keeping with the broad principle of techno-
logical neutrality endorsed in several of the Supreme Court’s pentalogy deci-
sions.208 The phrase technological neutrality entails several different
considerations;209 however, the core concept holds that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, laws should neither favour nor discriminate against particular
technologies.210 In SOCAN, Abella J noted that the principle of technological neu-
trality “seeks to have the Copyright Act applied in a way that operates consistently,
regardless of the form of media involved, or its technological sophistication.”211
The Supreme Court in ESA held that the Act should apply equally between tradi-
tional and more technologically advanced forms of the same media in keeping with
the principle of technological neutrality.212 The Court in ESA also suggested that
technological neutrality may be important in preserving the balance between own-
ers’ and users’ rights in digital environments.213
The Supreme Court decisions invoking this principle have so far compared
traditional media and traditional forms of content dissemination with online forms
(for example, comparing the sale of physical copies of musical works in SOCAN or
video games in ESA to online sales of the same media). However, this principle
could also suggest that somewhat different forms of digital media should be treated
alike, barring explicit legislative language to the contrary.214 Arguably, written fic-
tion published on text-based archive sites and audiovisual content hosted on video-
sharing sites are different “technologies”, or at least different forms of media.
Nothing in the language of the UGC provision distinguishes between audiovisual,
written, or other user-generated content. A technologically neutral reading of the
legislation could argue for including various fan made content of differing forms
within the provision’s ambit. This reading of section 29.21 appears more in keeping
with the Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement of technological neutrality as a
value that copyright law should strive for than a more restrictive interpretation
would be.215
208 See e.g. ESA, supra note 86 at para. 5; SOCAN, supra note 86 at para. 43; Rogers at
paras. 37-38.
209 For a discussion of these different aspects of technological neutrality, see Carys J.
Craig, “Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law” in
Michael Geist, ed, The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook
the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press,
2013) [The Copyright Pentalogy].
210 See ESA, supra note 86 at para. 9; see also Craig, supra note 209 at 272; see also
Gregory R. Hagen, “Technological Neutrality in Canadian Copyright Law”, in Michael
Geist, ed, The Copyright Pentalogy at 307.
211 SOCAN, supra note 86 at para. 43.
212 ESA, supra note 86 at para. 5.
213 See ESA, supra note 86 at para. 8; see also Craig, supra note 209 at 284.
214 See e.g. ESA, supra note 86 at para. 9.
215 See e.g. ESA, ibid. at paras. 4–6 and para. 9.
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As well, fan fiction and other forms of user-generated content fulfill similar
functions or goals. Mash-up videos can celebrate the original music or videos from
which they draw clips, songs, and images; they may seek to continue a story by
“splicing” together existing moments to depict something new or different, and
they may even parody or critique aspects of the original works.216 As Rebecca
Tushnet argues, well-conceived mash-up videos can offer insight or commentary
on troubling aspects of mainstream media,217 just as certain works of fan fiction
can “write back” to or challenge popular texts.218 The possibilities for videos, fan
fiction, and other forms of user-created content are as varied as the ideas, opinions,
and skills of their creators or writers. From this perspective, copyright without ap-
propriate exemptions (such as parody or UGC, or both) threatens the creation of
second generation texts which criticize first generation works; this, in turn, under-
mines the public’s ability to engage with and debate popular culture. It would make
little sense to protect this amateur and often critical discourse only when it is ex-
pressed through certain forms of media.
Moreover, even where fan works — including fiction and audiovisual me-
dia — do not necessarily challenge or critique first generation works, second gener-
ation creativity is nevertheless a worthwhile form of creativity. The Parliamentary
debates surrounding Bill C-11 and Bill C-32 demonstrate that at least some Mem-
bers recognized the value of the widespread, amateur public creativity which finds
expression in user-generated content, and wished to protect this creative output.219
Even amateur works of fairly limited skill or creativity can have some public bene-
fit, for example, by allowing hobbyists to develop talents in a given field, or by
promoting and celebrating the original works on which they comment (however
skillfully or poorly). The inclusion of the UGC provision suggests a commitment
on the part of policy-makers to protect and to encourage amateur, user-driven crea-
tive content development, when such content does not adversely impact rights
holders. As the debates in Parliament recognized, user-generated content may even
promote original works and indirectly benefit rights holders.220 It is illogical to
distinguish between fan fiction and audiovisual mash-ups, or to determine that this
protection should apply only to users who work with certain media, when nothing
in the section’s wording suggests such a distinction, and when the Supreme Court
has recently endorsed technological neutrality as an important copyright principle
(albeit in a different factual context).221 Such a restrictive reading would not give
effect to the apparent objectives of the UGC provision, the intention of Parliament,
216 Rebecca Tushnet, “Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups and Other Illegitimate Chil-
dren” (2011) 86 Notre Dame L Rev 2133 at 2135; see also Lipton, supra note 165 at
21-22 [“Scary Monsters”].
217 Tushnet, “Scary Monsters”, supra note 216.
218 Reynolds, “Impact”, supra note 7 at 38–41.
219 See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 124 (15 May 2012) at 1200
(Andrew Saxton).
220 See, again, Minister Paradis’ comments, supra note 175; see also McKay, supra note 1;
Jenkins, supra note 142.
221 ESA, supra note 86 at paras. 4–6 and 8-9.
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or the liberal approach to user rights that was articulated in CCH and that is now an
integral part of Canada’s fair dealing context.
In conclusion, although fan literature received little discussion in the debates
surrounding Bill C-32 and C-11,222 the language of section 29.21 read in context
and given its ordinary and grammatical meaning can readily encompass written fan
content. The relatively low threshold for finding that copyright subsists in a work
should be to the advantage of most fan fiction stories, and should serve to bring
them within the ambit of section 29.21(1). As well, common fan practices such as
attributing original works to their creators/owners and publishing stories through
non-commercial online intermediaries already often conform to the situations and
conditions contemplated in the UGC exemption. While our legislators may have
been primarily concerned with audiovisual materials distributed on YouTube or
similar sites,223 the practices of fan writers and video makers are analogous in
many ways. Furthermore, the principles and objectives that seem to underlie the
UGC exemption are equally applicable to written work and to other forms of user-
generated content. Writing and/or reading fan fiction is a common, non-commercial
practice that Canadian fans engage in every day, just as making or viewing videos
is for YouTube fans. Like amateur video makers, amateur writers are likely to have
weak positions relative to copyright holders, and are as deserving of some insula-
tion from costly infringement claims. Finally, fan writers contribute creatively to
public discourse about popular works just as creators of other user-generated con-
tent do. The text of the exemption and its apparent purposes can easily accommo-
date fan literature along with other forms of non-commercial user-generated con-
tent — an interpretation that would give effect to the liberal approach to users’
rights endorsed in CCH and the pentalogy and, arguably, to the principle of techno-
logical neutrality endorsed in Entertainment Software Association as well.224
(c) Possible advantages of s. 29.21 for fan literature
The likely inclusion of fan fiction within section 29.21 should come as a relief
to fan writers. While the parody and satire exemptions in section 29 of the Copy-
right Act may also benefit (some) fan authors, the UGC exemption could offer sev-
eral unique advantages over and above other fair dealing categories. In particular,
the placement of the UGC exemption within a separate section of the Act, after
section 29’s fair dealing categories and before the subsequent provisions clarifying
the legality of reproductions for private purposes or for later use,225 could suggest
that the UGC exception is to be treated as an ex ante category of non-infringing
uses. If this is indeed the case, then the UGC exemption could provide an important
pre-emptive statement that non-commercial user-generated content which meets the
222 See, for example, Véronyque Roy, legal counsel for the Union des écrivaines et des
écrivains québécois on the provision’s application to written fan fiction, supra note
207.
223 See e.g. Minister Paradis, supra note 175, referring to the mixes of musical and video
content at which the provision is primarily aimed; see also e.g. Elizabeth May on the
“YouTube” exemption, supra note 173.
224 ESA, supra note 86 at paras. 4–6 and para. 9.
225 Copyright Act, supra note 39 at ss. 29.22-29.23.
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provision’s conditions does not infringe copyright. Such a proactive statement
could offer greater stability and certainty to amateur content creators (whether they
write fan fiction, create videos, or publish other forms of UGC) than the more con-
textualized and ex post facto determinations of fair dealing.226 Jacqueline Lipton,
writing about the American context, has commented that this lack of ex ante cer-
tainty about whether a given use is fair disadvantages potential users.227 Canada’s
UGC exemption could mitigate this problem by stating, in an ex ante manner, that
uses of copyrighted works falling within the provision’s ambit and conforming to
its criteria are non-infringing. Several aspects of the new UGC provision seem to
support this interpretation.
First, the placement of the UGC exemption in a distinct section, rather than
within sections 29–29.2, could suggest that the provision was intended as a distinct
exemption apart from the ex post facto fair dealing categories, which must undergo
the reactive and highly contextualized fair dealing analysis. Second, the wording
and format of section 29.21 strongly resemble the new backup copy and time shift-
ing exemptions in section 29.22 and section 29.23, by stating that “it is not an
infringement of copyright” to use copyrighted works for specified purposes, which
are further developed and limited in those sections. It seems likely, based on state-
ments by Government Members, that the backup copy and time shifting provisions
were intended as a proactive licence to Canadians to engage in these uses within
certain parameters;228 the same could be true of section 29.21, which follows a
very similar format. As well, the UGC exemption explicitly incorporates some of
the CCH factors, especially the final factor, which examines the effect of the deal-
ing on the work. The inclusion of this factor could, in turn, imply that section 29.21
is intended to stand on its own and need not undergo a fair dealing analysis akin to
the section 29 categories, provided the user-generated content meets the 29.21
conditions.
This interpretation may be the most beneficial to fan fiction writers. This read-
ing of section 29.21 offers a greater degree of ex ante certainty about which non-
commercial uses of copyrighted content do not infringe copyright, and which con-
ditions users must comply with in order to benefit from the exemption. This more
proactive form of legal guidance (as opposed to a reactive fair dealing analysis
requiring the use of elusive and potentially arbitrary tests) is yet another promising
feature of the UGC provision.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The fan fiction genre has much to recommend it. Fan narratives may explore
perspectives that are absent or underrepresented in mainstream media, challenge or
celebrate popular works in a varied, democratic online discourse, and allow ama-
teur writers to develop their skills. Protecting fan fiction — and other forms of sec-
ond generation creativity inspired by copyrighted works — is therefore a laudable
226 Lipton, supra note 165 at 22-23.
227 Ibid.
228 See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 31 (18 October 2011) at
1050 (Hon. James Moore), articulating the government’s intent to legalize format shift-
ing, time shifting and backup copies.
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goal for copyright reform. Canada’s recent amendments to the Copyright Act have
taken important steps in this regard. Prior to these reforms, Canada’s copyright
landscape seemed inhospitable to fan fiction, given the apparent inapplicability of
the original fair dealing categories to much fan writing. Now, the new fair dealing
categories of parody and satire, and, especially, the non-commercial user-generated
content provision should give fan writers significant hope. While it remains to be
seen how far these provisions will be extended, or how they will be interpreted if
and when litigation regarding fan fiction arises, the provisions coupled with the
liberal approach to copyright which the Supreme Court has articulated are promis-
ing for second generation creators. The non-commercial user-generated content
provision may be a particularly advantageous innovation, as its language does not
limit its scope to any particular media or technologies, and as it may offer a level of
proactive legal guidance that a reactive and highly contextualized fair dealing anal-
ysis — even a liberal one — cannot. The legal future of fan fiction in Canada
seems brighter than ever before. 

